This may seem alarmist. The very fact that there are numerous books and articles on Hardy and science would seem to give the lie to any suggestion that such work is disallowed. Yet it remains the case that if we want our work to gain a wider hearing beyond ourselves -if we want literature and science to be taken as seriously as a discipline as History of Science is, indeed if we want historians of science to take as much account of our work as we do of theirs -then we need to defend our own practices, to explain how and why it is that we make the claims we do, and what our work contributes that History of Science on its own may lack. At the same time, we need to make it clear that the standards of judgement for the two disciplines, although equivalent, are not the same.
The nature of the engagement between literature and science is often nebulous, at least on first impressions. To give an example from my own recent research, the Pre-Raphaelites repeatedly cite science as a model for their art in the essays published in their short-lived periodical The Germ, which ran for four issues in 1850. However, they do not define clearly what they mean by science, nor precisely how they imagine that art should go about imitating its practice. One approach to this question, grounded in the methodology of History of Science, would be to try and place Holman Hunt, Frederick George Stephens, Dante Gabriel Rossetti and the other PreRaphaelite artists, critics and poets in relation to contemporary debates on scientific method between William Whewell, John Stuart Mill, George Henry Lewes and others. This would be to presuppose that the Pre-Raphaelites read these debates, however, or at least that they had their own precise understanding of scientific method that could be formulated in the same terms. But there is little evidence to suggest that this is the case. What they did have was an idea of science which, though vague, was nevertheless of central importance both to their rhetoric and to their conception of their own practice. To try to place this idea precisely within the history and philosophy of science is to chase a chimera, yet to assume therefore that there is nothing interesting or rigorous that can be said without this kind of precision is to fail to recognise the key significance of science to the most original and influential Victorian art movement. In case this reads as though I am attacking a straw-man, it was on just these grounds that a piece of work I wrote on this subject was turned down for publication by a major English Literature journal.
We have an intellectual responsibility to ensure that our work is as rigorous on our own terms as we can make it. This was made painfully clear to me when I gave a paper on Darwinism and poetry several years ago in Sheffield. I took Robert Bridges's poem "Poor Poll," written in 1921, as my text, reading it as a meditation on the cultural impact of Darwin's ideas (albeit one addressed to a pet parrot). I drew attention to Bridges's emphasis on kinship between different species, to his use of the language of adaptation and environment, to the recurrence of monkey imagery, to hints at geological time, to the ways in which the parrot is identified with the church and churchmen, to the narrative thread in which a British sailor to South America unseats her from paradise, and so on. Afterwards a professor of linguistics took me to task for doing what, as she saw it, all literary critics do, which was to impose my own reading onto the text. In this case I would still defend my reading, taking support from the knowledge that Bridges responded to Darwin directly and repeatedly in other experimental poems he wrote after 1900, from Now in Wintry Delights (1903) to The Testament of Beauty (1929) . But the experience itself brought home to me how important it is to be sure that the interpretative claims we make are robust and convincing. By prioritising the literary texts themselves we can offer readings of them that are internally consistent and persuasive. If the evidence is there in the texts, it does not ultimately matter whether or not there is supporting evidence elsewhere. Even so, we should be frank about the nature of that evidence, and not be betrayed into making claims it cannot support. It is better to admit that the material we are working on cannot be precisely inserted into debates on the history of science than to assert on the basis of flimsy analogies or passing resemblances that Hunt took Whewell's side against Mill or vice versa, or that Rossetti had any given physicist in mind when he used the term 'ether' in "The Blessed Damozel." By not over-reaching ourselves as historians of science we can make the case more convincingly that our own methods and sources reveal things about the reception and reworking of scientific ideas, and about their implications and significance, that History of Science alone cannot discern with the same subtlety.
As well as having its own methodologies, History of Science has a firm ideology. It defines itself against the familiar Whig view of science as the progressive discovery of knowledge still favoured by many scientists themselves. This is essential if History of Science is not to be merely the tame chronicler of science itself. But it can nevertheless lead to certain aspects of the past being given priority over others. Historians of science such as M. J. S. Hodge, Peter Bowler, Jim Secord, James Moore and others rightly object to Darwin being treated as of paramount and unique importance within Victorian biology merely because he happened (in some regards) to get things right. They have devoted themselves to understanding Darwin's own thinking in toto, not merely those bits of it that have been vindicated by subsequent science, and to recovering the evolutionary theories of his antecedents, contemporaries and successors, which jostled with his own for attention and authority in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This work has been intensely interesting and immensely valuable. This has led, however, to a situation where, in Hodge's words, "historians are now agreed" that natural selection 'was accepted hardly at all for nearly half a century after Darwin's death" (Hodge 114) . As a literature scholar approaching evolution in this period through the writings of novelists, poets and indeed scientists themselves, this conclusion appears to me to be patently false. Echoing Theodosius Dobzhansky's famous adage that 'Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution,' a great deal of late Victorian and Edwardian culture makes no sense if we presume that natural selection was an idea with no currency. H. G. Wells's science fiction, Hardy's novels and poetry, the rise of eugenics and Huxley's counter attack in Evolution and Ethics, Edwin Ray Lankester's columns in the Daily Telegraph and the interventions by Nature into the debates round Darwin's legacy at his centenary -all bear witness to the vitality of natural selection as an idea both within biology and in the wider culture during the socalled 'eclipse of Darwinism' around the turn of the century. From outside History of Science, it looks as though the intellectual ideology of the discipline itself has so shaped its perspective as to determine the picture of the past that the historians see. If we see the past from a different angle, we should not be ashamed to own it, nor to supplement their picture with our own. Equally, we should be cautious about depending too heavily on the authority of historians whose angle of vision differs markedly from that of our own subjects -the authors and readers of the works we are discussing.
There is one final sense in which we should feel free to emancipate ourselves from the History of Science, which is to consider how far we want our own enquiries to defer to history at all. We may choose to take not only the culture of science, historically conceived, as our subject, but science itself. 'Presentism' is a dirty word in the lexicon of historicist criticism, and clearly we must not forget that the present, like all moments, is embedded in history, both diachronically and synchronically. But for all that History of Science is right to call into question the linear, progressive model of the growth of science, while progress may not be linear, current science remains nonetheless our best approximation to knowledge of the workings of the universe. We read literature first and foremost in the present moment too -if it did not live for us today, then the study of literature would be just a branch of archaeology. Literature in its broad sense -the deliberate, creative and imaginative use of language -is humanity's most sophisticated device for exploring its own condition. Science itself and the knowledge that science gives us also falls within that purview. Poets, novelists, dramatists and scientists themselves respond to new knowledge as they receive it. If the broad foundations of that knowledge remain in place, for all that the details may have changed, their responses remain as pertinent today as they were when they were first set down. By reading literature alongside science today, we can explore what it is to live in the world science reveals to us, not for the present moment only, but for as long as that science remains a satisfactory account of the world we live in.
